Category: General

  • Treatment of Trust Interest and Trust Bank Charges – Section 86(2) Trust Accounts

     

    Treatment of Trust Interest and Trust Bank Charges – Section 86(2) Trust Accounts


    1. Policy Title

    Accounting Treatment of Trust Interest, Trust Bank Charges, VAT Components, and LPFF Settlements for Section 86(2) Trust Accounts


    2. Purpose of This Policy

    This policy prescribes the correct accounting treatment for:

    • Interest earned on attorneys’ trust accounts governed by section 86(2) of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014;
    • Trust bank charges and their VAT components; and
    • Payments of trust interest to the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund (LPFF).

    The objective is to ensure compliance with statutory requirements, accurate financial reporting, and a clear audit trail consistent with banking mechanics and LPC oversight.


    3. Scope and Applicability

    This policy applies exclusively to:

    • General trust accounts governed by section 86(2) of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014, where:
      • Interest earned on trust funds accrues to the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund, and
      • The legal practice is entitled only to prescribed offsets (principally net bank charges).

    This policy does not apply to:

    • Section 86(3) trust accounts (client-specific interest-bearing accounts);
    • Section 86(4) trust investment arrangements; or
    • Any other trust structures where interest accrues to a client or third party.

    Separate policies must be applied to those arrangements.


    Section 86(2) of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 provides that:

    • Interest earned on trust money deposited in a general trust account is payable to the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund,
    • Subject to such deductions as may be permitted in terms of the Act and applicable rules.

    Accordingly, trust interest earned under section 86(2) does not constitute income of the firm.


    5. Accounting Classification

    Account Name: Trust Interest Payable to LPFF
    Account Type: Current Liability

    This account represents the net amount of interest earned on section 86(2) trust funds that is payable to the LPFF after permitted offsets.


    6. Recognition of Trust Interest Earned

    When interest is credited by the bank to the section 86(2) trust account:

    • Debit: Trust Bank Account
    • Credit: Trust Interest Payable to LPFF

    The interest is recognised immediately as a liability, not as revenue.


    7. Treatment of Trust Bank Charges

    Trust bank charges must be accounted for in accordance with their actual allocation by the bank and their relationship to trust interest.

    7.1 Net Bank Charges Covered by Trust Interest

    Where trust interest is available, banks automatically offset bank charges net of VAT against that interest before remitting the balance to the LPFF.

    Accounting treatment:

    • Debit: Trust Interest Payable to LPFF
    • Credit: Trust Bank Account

    This reduces the LPFF liability and has no profit-and-loss impact.


    7.2 VAT Portion of Trust Bank Charges

    The VAT component of trust bank charges:

    • Is not part of the statutory offset against LPFF interest under section 86(2);
    • Is not absorbed by trust interest; and
    • Is mechanically redirected by the bank to the business account.

    Accounting treatment:

    • Recognised as a firm operating expense;
    • VAT recovery, if any, is accounted for in accordance with the firm’s VAT status and applicable recovery mechanisms.

    The VAT portion must not be posted to the Trust Interest Payable to LPFF account.


    7.3 Bank Charges Not Covered by Trust Interest

    Where trust interest is insufficient to cover bank charges:

    • The uncovered portion is automatically debited to the business account;
    • This portion is a firm expense and does not affect the LPFF liability.

    8. Payment of Trust Interest to the LPFF

    When trust interest is paid over to the LPFF:

    • Debit: Trust Interest Payable to LPFF
    • Credit: Trust Bank Account

    This entry represents settlement of a liability and must never be treated as an expense.


    9. Prohibited Treatments

    Under no circumstances may the following occur in respect of section 86(2) trust accounts:

    • Trust interest recognised as firm income;
    • Payments to the LPFF recognised as expenses;
    • VAT components of trust bank charges debited to the LPFF liability;
    • Gross bank charges used to reduce the LPFF liability;
    • Retrospective adjustments to LPFF interest based on later VAT recoveries.

    10. Audit and Control Considerations

    • The bank’s automatic allocation between trust and business accounts provides an objective audit trail.
    • The balance on Trust Interest Payable to LPFF must at all times reconcile to:
      • Interest earned
      • Less net bank charges covered by interest
      • Less amounts paid to the LPFF.

    11. Conclusion

    For section 86(2) trust accounts, trust interest accounting is fundamentally a liability-based process, not an income or expense process, except to the limited extent that VAT components and uncovered bank charges are genuine firm expenses.

    This policy reflects the minimum accounting treatment required for statutory compliance, consistency with banking practice, and audit-defensible financial records.

  • Case Analysis: South African Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims Commission, Western Cape and Others [2025] ZACC 25 (13 November 2025)

     


    1.0 Introduction and Factual Background

    The dispute between the Sadien family land claimants and the South African Riding for the Disabled Association (SARDA) presents a complex intersection of constitutional rights within South Africa’s land restitution framework. This fifteen-year litigation journey, which culminated in the Constitutional Court in 2025, illustrates the inherent tensions that can arise when addressing historical injustices whilst protecting the interests of third parties who may themselves serve important social functions.

    At its core, this case required the judiciary to balance competing constitutional imperatives: the section 25(7) right to restitution for victims of racially discriminatory dispossession, and the property and administrative rights of a long-term occupier of state land. The legal journey that unfolded raised fundamental questions about procedural fairness, the limits of judicial powers, the doctrine of finality, and the appropriate mechanisms for resolving disputes where no outcome can fully satisfy all affected parties.

    1.1 Historical Context: The Sadien Family Dispossession

    In 1902, the forebear of the Sadien family acquired property described as Erf 2274 Constantia. The land was later registered in the names of his five sons – the Sadien brothers – who, together with their extended families, established a communal agricultural enterprise on the property, cultivating and selling fruits and vegetables.

    This way of life was destroyed by apartheid legislation. The Group Areas Act 77 of 1957 and Proclamation 34 of 1961 designated the land as a “white group area.” Under threat of forced removal, the Sadien brothers sold the property on 21 March 1962 for approximately R13,550  a consideration subsequently found to be substantially below market value – to a person who still owns it and has obtained development rights increasing its value to a seven figure sum. This dispossession formed the legal and factual foundation of the family’s restitution claim.

    1.2 SARDA’s Position and Interest

    The South African Riding for the Disabled Association is a non-profit organisation providing equine-assisted therapy to children and adults with disabilities in the Western Cape. SARDA has occupied state-owned land spanning 4 adjacent erven 141, 142, 560 and 684 Constantia since 1980 – a period exceeding 40 years by the time of the Constitutional Court’s 2025 judgment.

    SARDA’s occupation was lawful, though its tenure remained precarious. The organisation had made substantial investments in facilities and infrastructure to support its therapeutic programmes. It maintained that it had received assurances from state officials, including a promise of a 50-year lease in 2011, which created legitimate expectations regarding its continued occupation.

    1.3 The Parties

    The principal parties in the final Constitutional Court appeal were:

    • The Applicant: South African Riding for the Disabled Association (SARDA), seeking to protect its interests as lawful occupier of Erf 142 Constantia.
    • The Land Claimants (Respondents): The Sadien family, initially represented by individual descendants (Sediek Sadien and Ebrahim Sadien), later substituted by family trusts representing a broader group of beneficiaries.
    • The State (First Respondent): The Regional Land Claims Commission, Western Cape, the statutory body responsible for processing and facilitating land claims.

    The tension between these parties – and the constitutional values each represented – would define the contours of this protracted litigation.


    2.0 The Land Claims Court Proceedings (2011-2013)

    2.1 The Initial Adjudication (2011)

    Following South Africa’s democratic transition, various Sadien family members lodged land claims between 1995 and 1998. Between 2001 and 2003, the Regional Land Claims Commission consolidated these individual claims into a single family claim for adjudication.

    The Land Claims Court heard the matter and on 19 May 2011 delivered judgment finding:

    • The Sadien brothers had been dispossessed of Erf 2274 as a result of racially discriminatory laws and practices
    • The compensation received at the time of forced sale (R13,550) was not just and equitable
    • The family was entitled to restitution under the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994

    2.2 The Remedy: Alternative Land (2012)

    On 7 December 2012, the Land Claims Court (per Mpshe AJ) addressed the form of restitution:

    Findings on restoration of original land:

    • The court determined that restoration of Erf 2274 itself was not feasible
    • The property had been substantially developed and held development rights valued at approximately R132 million
    • The value of the land was estimated between R80-140 million
    • Full restoration would be “financially too onerous” for the state

    The alternative remedy ordered:

    • The court ordered transfer of alternative state-owned land under section 35(1)(b) of the Restitution Act
    • The initial order specified Erf 1783 Constantia, believed to be approximately 10 hectares
    • The land was to be transferred to Sediek Sadien as representative of the claimants

    2.3 The Suo Motu Variation (8 February 2013)

    A significant development occurred when the court discovered that Erf 1783 measured only 2.6 hectares, not the assumed 10 hectares. On 8 February 2013, the Land Claims Court acted suo motu (on its own motion) to vary its December 2012 order:

    The variation:

    • Substituted Erf 142 Constantia (8.9 hectares) for the previously awarded Erf 1783
    • Ordered transfer of Erf 142 to Sediek Sadien
    • Made the variation without notice to affected parties

    The legal significance:
    This suo motu variation of what appeared to be a final order raised several questions:

    1. Whether the court had become functus officio (exhausted its jurisdiction over the matter)
    2. Whether procedural fairness required notice to SARDA as the long-term occupier of Erf 142
    3. Whether the court’s power to designate alternative land extended to unilateral substitution

    Critically, SARDA – which had occupied Erf 142 since 1980 – received no notice of these proceedings or the variation order directly affecting its tenure.


    3.1 SARDA’s Initial Attempts to Intervene

    Upon discovering that the land it occupied had been awarded to the Sadien family, SARDA initiated a series of applications seeking to protect its interests:

    First attempt – Supreme Court of Appeal (2014):

    • On 22 September 2014, SARDA applied to the SCA for leave to intervene and for rescission of the LCC’s orders
    • The SCA struck the application from the roll, finding it lacked jurisdiction
    • The SCA noted that the pending appeal concerned only costs, not the substantive land transfer order
    • Section 35(11) of the Restitution Act requires an appeal to be pending “in respect of such order”

    Second attempt – Land Claims Court (2015):

    • SARDA brought its intervention and rescission application directly to the LCC
    • On 11 September 2015, the LCC dismissed the application
    • The court held that SARDA lacked a “direct and substantial legal interest” in the proceedings
    • The LCC found SARDA’s interest was “purely financial” rather than a legal interest justifying intervention

    SARDA then sought leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court.

    3.2 The Constitutional Court’s 2017 Judgment: Defining SARDA’s Interest

    On 23 February 2017, the Constitutional Court handed down a judgment that would define the parameters of the dispute for years to come.

    The Court’s findings on standing:

    The Constitutional Court (per Froneman J) held:

    1. SARDA did have a direct and substantial interest in the restitution proceedings
    2. This interest arose from section 35(9) of the Restitution Act, which provides that lawful occupiers displaced by restitution orders are entitled to “just and equitable compensation”
    3. SARDA therefore had standing to intervene for the purpose of securing compensation
    4. However, this interest was limited to compensation and did not extend to challenging the transfer of the land itself

    Key reasoning:

    The court balanced competing considerations:

    • SARDA’s 35+ years of lawful occupation created legitimate interests deserving protection
    • However, the rights of lawful occupiers “do not trump the rights of claimants to have their land restored”
    • Section 35(9) provides the appropriate mechanism for protecting occupiers through compensation
    • Allowing broader standing would enable third parties to obstruct constitutionally mandated restitution

    The operative order:

    The court:

    • Granted SARDA leave to appeal and intervene
    • Declared that SARDA’s interest was limited to just and equitable compensation under section 35(9)
    • Found it “unnecessary to rescind” the LCC’s 2013 varied order
    • Remitted the matter to the LCC for determination of appropriate compensation

    Implications and ambiguities:

    This judgment resolved SARDA’s immediate standing challenge but left several questions:

    1. What process would determine “just and equitable” compensation?
    2. Could SARDA participate in proceedings that might affect the quantum of compensation?
    3. Was the 2017 finding on standing final and immutable, or could changed circumstances warrant reconsideration?
    4. Did the finding that rescission was “unnecessary” constitute a final determination that the 2013 order was legally valid?

    4.0 Post-2017 Developments: Changing Circumstances (2020-2024)

    4.1 The 2020 Variation Order

    Following the Constitutional Court’s 2017 remittal, significant developments occurred. On [date] 2020, the Land Claims Court (now renamed the Land Court) issued a variation order ([2020] ZALCC 23):

    Key features:

    • Substituted parties to include family trusts alongside individual claimants
    • Ordered that land be transferred “in equal shares” among verified Sadien family members
    • Included a suspension clause: transfer was suspended pending determination of just and equitable compensation to SARDA
    • Recognised SARDA’s status as an intervener in the proceedings

    Significance:
    The suspension clause appeared to acknowledge SARDA’s section 35(9) rights and suggest that compensation must be resolved before dispossession could occur.

    4.2 SARDA’s Formal Intervener Status (2022)

    On 21 June 2022, the Land Court issued an order ([2022] ZALCC 34) formally granting SARDA intervener status in the proceedings.

    This created an apparent legal framework where:

    • SARDA was recognised as a formal party with standing to participate
    • Its rights to compensation were acknowledged
    • Procedures existed for it to be heard on relevant issues

    4.3 The 2024 Variation Order: Fundamental Changes

    On 1 November 2024, the Land Court issued a further variation order ([2024] ZALCC 38) that substantially altered the nature of the relief:

    Major changes:

    1. Multiplication of beneficiaries: Substituted five family trusts as parties, representing approximately 300 individual beneficiaries (compared to the original single representative)
    2. Equal share distribution: Ordered that the 8.9-hectare property be transferred “in equal shares” to all verified family members
    3. Reallocation of portions: A 2% portion previously allocated to one individual was redistributed among all beneficiaries
    4. Suspension maintained: Like the 2020 order, transfer remained suspended pending SARDA’s compensation determination

    Practical implications:

    The multiplication of beneficiaries raised serious questions:

    • Physical subdivision: 8.9 hectares ÷ 300 beneficiaries = approximately 297m² per person
    • Whether such subdivision was practically executable
    • Whether it was consistent with planning and zoning regulations
    • Whether equal shares meant equal physical portions or some form of collective ownership
    • How title registration would function with 300 co-owners

    4.4 SARDA’s Response: Counter-Application

    In response to the trust intervention application, SARDA filed a counter-application seeking:

    1. Amendment or rescission of the 2012 and 2013 orders to remove Erf 142 from their scope
    2. Alternative relief if rescission was refused

    SARDA’s grounds included:

    • The 2024 order was incapable of execution due to the multiplication of beneficiaries
    • Changed circumstances since 2017 (intervener status, fundamental changes to relief)
    • Procedural irregularities in adding hundreds of beneficiaries without full hearing
    • The 2017 Constitutional Court order was wrongly decided or decided per incuriam (through lack of care)

    The Land Court’s response:

    The Land Court dismissed SARDA’s counter-application, finding:

    • SARDA lacked standing to bring the application
    • The issues SARDA sought to raise were foreclosed by the 2017 Constitutional Court judgment
    • SARDA’s interest remained limited to compensation

    This dismissal formed the basis for SARDA’s final appeal to the Constitutional Court.


    5.0 The Constitutional Court’s 2025 Judgment: Finality and Standing

    5.1 The Application and Issues

    SARDA sought direct leave to appeal the Land Court’s 2024 dismissal of its counter-application. The application raised two primary challenges:

    1. Challenge to the 2024 substitution order: SARDA argued the order was:
      • Incapable of execution (300 beneficiaries, indivisible land)
      • Incoherent and legally defective
      • Made without proper procedural fairness
    2. Request to rescind the 2013 varied order: SARDA argued the original suo motu variation was:
      • Procedurally unfair (no notice to affected parties)
      • Beyond the court’s jurisdiction (functus officio)
      • Made without proper legal foundation

    The threshold issue:

    Before reaching the merits, the Constitutional Court had to determine whether SARDA had standing to bring these challenges – a question necessarily informed by the Court’s own 2017 judgment.

    5.2 The Parties’ Positions

    SARDA’s arguments:

    1. The 2017 order was interlocutory: SARDA contended that the 2017 finding on standing was not final because:
      • It merely addressed SARDA’s right to intervene, not the ultimate merits
      • Changed circumstances (intervener status, multiplication of beneficiaries) warranted reconsideration
      • The order was capable of variation by the Land Court on good cause shown
    2. Alternatively, the 2017 order was per incuriam: SARDA argued the 2017 judgment was wrongly decided due to:
      • Material non-disclosure (50-year lease promise, full occupation history, planning designations)
      • Failure to consider the practical impossibility of executing subsequent orders
      • Error in limiting standing to compensation alone
    3. The interests of justice: SARDA maintained that finality could only be achieved by reconsidering the 2017 order

    The Sadien family’s position:

    The respondents argued:

    1. The 2017 order was final and definitive on SARDA’s standing
    2. SARDA sought an impermissible rehearing of settled issues
    3. No proper rescission application had been brought
    4. The interests of justice favoured finality after 60+ years since dispossession
    5. SARDA’s repeated challenges constituted an abuse of process

    The Commission’s position:

    The first respondent similarly contended:

    1. SARDA lacked standing to oppose the trust intervention
    2. SARDA’s approach amounted to collateral attack on a final order
    3. The constitutional imperative of restitution required finality

    5.3 The Court’s Judgment (Kollapen J)

    On 13 November 2025, the Constitutional Court delivered a unanimous judgment dismissing SARDA’s application.

    Finding 1: The 2017 order was final, not interlocutory

    The court held:

    • An order’s finality is determined by its effect, not merely its form or label
    • The 2017 order had “final and definitive” effect because it:
      • Made a substantive determination of SARDA’s legal interest
      • Conclusively limited SARDA’s participation to compensation matters
      • Precluded SARDA from seeking any other relief in the restitution proceedings
    • This was not merely a procedural ruling but a determination of substantive rights
    • No lower court could “alter this Court’s finding after it had pronounced on it”

    Finding 2: SARDA lacked standing

    Based on the finality of the 2017 order, the court concluded:

    • SARDA’s interest remained limited to compensation
    • SARDA had no legal interest in:
      • The identity of the transferees (whether trusts or individuals)
      • The number of beneficiaries
      • The structure of the transfer
      • The merits of the substitution application
    • Therefore, SARDA lacked standing to:
      • Oppose the trust intervention application
      • Bring a counter-application for rescission
      • Appeal the Land Court’s 2024 order

    Finding 3: No rescission application

    The court noted:

    • SARDA had asked the court to depart from its 2017 order
    • However, no formal rescission application had been brought
    • During oral argument, SARDA’s counsel conceded “one should have been brought”
    • Without a proper application, the court could not consider rescission
    • In any event, the principles of legal certainty and finality militated against rescission

    Finding 4: SARDA’s conduct

    The court made strong observations about SARDA’s approach:

    • SARDA had “misconceived the extent of its interest” in 2017
    • The current application went “beyond a mere misconception to what could only be viewed as a refusal to accept the extent of its interest and a disregard of this Court’s 2017 order”
    • This conduct was characterized as “puzzling and somewhat troubling”

    Finding 5: The imperative of finality in restitution

    The court emphasized:

    • Restitution is the means to “address and rectify the injustices of the past”
    • “Addressing past injustices and providing equitable redress inherently requires finality”
    • The Sadien family was dispossessed in 1963
    • Over 60 years later and 13 years after the original award, they still had not received the land
    • “Through repeated legal challenges and the disregard for this Court’s 2017 judgment, SARDA has furthered the delay”

    5.4 The Costs Order

    The court made a significant ruling on costs, departing from the usual Biowatch principle.

    The Biowatch principle:

    • Generally protects public interest litigants from adverse costs when pursuing constitutional matters against the state
    • Based on the principle that access to courts should not be chilled by costs concerns
    • Assumes litigants act in good faith and raise genuine constitutional issues

    The court’s departure:

    The court held that SARDA should not receive Biowatch protection because:

    1. The Biowatch principle is not unqualified
    2. It does not apply where litigation is “frivolous or vexatious, or in any other way manifestly inappropriate”
    3. SARDA’s conduct fell into this category because it:
      • Disregarded a final Constitutional Court order
      • Impermissibly sought to re-litigate settled issues
      • Was “procedurally inept and devoid of merit”
    4. No fundamental constitutional right against the state was being enforced – the challenge was to beneficiary substitution

    Mitigating factors:

    The court exercised discretion considering:

    • SARDA is a non-profit organisation
    • It performs “important work to assist the disability community”
    • Therefore, costs were awarded but not costs of two counsel (as requested)

    5.5 The Operative Order

    The court:

    1. Dismissed the application for leave to appeal
    2. Ordered SARDA to pay the respondents’ costs (but not costs of two counsel)

    6.1 SARDA’s Perspective: Procedural Justice Concerns

    From SARDA’s viewpoint, several legitimate concerns emerge:

    Procedural fairness issues:

    1. No notice (2013): The original variation substituting Erf 142 was made without notice to SARDA despite 30+ years of occupation
    2. Ex parte designation: The court appeared to select and designate alternative land unilaterally
    3. Changed circumstances: The 2024 order fundamentally altered the relief (1 beneficiary → 300), arguably creating a “new case”
    4. Broken promises: State officials allegedly promised a 50-year lease in 2011, then awarded the land away

    Substantive concerns:

    1. Impossibility of execution: 8.9 hectares cannot practically be subdivided among 300 people
    2. Planning law: The District Plan allegedly designates the land for community/educational use (SARDA’s function)
    3. Social impact: Displacement would end therapeutic services to children with disabilities
    4. Legitimate expectations: 40+ years of occupation with state acquiescence created reasonable reliance

    Legal arguments:

    1. Functus officio: Did the LCC exceed its jurisdiction by varying a final order suo motu?
    2. Separation of powers: Did the court usurp executive functions by designating land rather than ordering the state to do so?
    3. Administrative justice: Were decisions made in accordance with PAJA requirements?

    6.2 The Sadien Family’s Perspective: Historical Justice

    From the claimants’ viewpoint, equally compelling considerations exist:

    Historical injustice:

    1. Forced dispossession (1962): The family was expelled from land held since 1902 due to racist legislation
    2. Grossly inadequate compensation: R13,550 for valuable agricultural land was manifestly unjust
    3. Generational impact: Dispossession destroyed a communal livelihood and displaced entire families
    4. Constitutional right: Section 25(7) enshrines the right to restitution as a fundamental remedy

    Legal entitlement:

    1. Valid claim: Courts at every level found the dispossession was discriminatory and the claim valid
    2. Impracticality of restoration: Original land (Erf 2274) valued at R80-140 million, making restoration impossible
    3. Statutory framework: The Restitution Act expressly provides for alternative land as a remedy
    4. Family evolution: The substitution of trusts reflects the natural evolution of family structure over 60+ years

    Delay and frustration:

    1. 60+ years since dispossession: The 1962 dispossession occurred over six decades ago
    2. 13+ years since award: The 2012 judgment still hasn’t been implemented
    3. Repeated obstacles: SARDA’s challenges have prevented finalization despite multiple court orders
    4. Justice delayed: Each year of delay denies an aging generation their constitutional right

    6.3 The State’s Position: Balancing Act

    The state (Regional Land Claims Commission) faced inherent tensions:

    Constitutional obligations:

    1. Restitution mandate: Section 25(7) requires the state to facilitate restitution
    2. Administrative fairness: PAJA requires lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair decisions
    3. Resource constraints: Limited availability of suitable alternative state land

    Practical challenges:

    1. Competing claims: Both parties have legitimate interests deserving protection
    2. No perfect solution: Any decision necessarily disappoints one party
    3. Compensation determination: Difficulty in quantifying “just and equitable” compensation for SARDA

    The case highlights several competing legal principles:

    Finality vs. Correctness:

    • The doctrine of res judicata requires finality to prevent endless litigation
    • However, manifestly incorrect decisions may perpetuate injustice
    • When do interests in finality outweigh interests in correctness?

    Restitution vs. Current Occupiers:

    • Section 25(7) prioritizes remedying historical dispossession
    • Section 35(9) protects lawful occupiers through compensation
    • How should courts balance these when both serve important constitutional values?

    Procedural Fairness vs. Expedition:

    • Affected parties deserve notice and opportunity to be heard
    • Restitution delayed is restitution denied
    • How much process is due when delay perpetuates historical injustice?

    Judicial Power vs. Administrative Function:

    • Courts have broad remedial powers in restitution matters
    • Separation of powers requires courts not to usurp executive functions
    • Where is the boundary between judicial designation and executive implementation?

    7.0 Unresolved Questions and Systemic Implications

    7.1 Questions Left Unanswered

    Several significant legal questions remain unresolved:

    On the 2013 variation:

    • Was the suo motu variation of a final order legally valid?
    • Did procedural fairness require notice to SARDA in 2013?
    • Was the court’s designation of alternative land within its statutory powers?

    On the 2024 order:

    • Is the order capable of practical execution?
    • How will 8.9 hectares be divided among 300 beneficiaries?
    • What form of ownership is contemplated (co-ownership, subdivision, trust arrangement)?
    • Does the order comply with planning and zoning requirements?

    On compensation:

    • What constitutes “just and equitable” compensation for SARDA?
    • Who determines compensation and through what process?
    • Does SARDA have standing to participate in compensation determination?
    • When must compensation be paid relative to dispossession?

    On rescission:

    • Could SARDA bring a proper rescission application challenging the 2017 order?
    • What would constitute sufficient grounds (per incuriam, material non-disclosure)?
    • Would changed circumstances since 2017 be relevant?

    7.2 Systemic Implications for Land Restitution

    This case reveals broader challenges in the restitution system:

    Third-party rights:

    • How should restitution processes identify and protect affected third parties?
    • What notice and participation rights should occupiers have?
    • Can the tension between restitution and occupier rights be better managed?

    Alternative land designation:

    • What criteria should govern selection of alternative land?
    • Should courts designate land or merely order the executive to do so?
    • How can disputes over alternative land be resolved expeditiously?

    Practical executability:

    • Should courts assess whether orders are practically executable before granting them?
    • What happens when family groups multiply over decades?
    • How should collective/communal ownership be structured?

    Compensation mechanisms:

    • Should compensation to displaced occupiers be determined before or after the restitution award?
    • What factors should inform “just and equitable” compensation?
    • How can compensation disputes be expedited?

    7.3 The Disability Rights Dimension

    An often-overlooked aspect is the impact on persons with disabilities:

    SARDA’s social function:

    • Provides therapeutic services to children and adults with disabilities
    • Serves a vulnerable population with limited alternative service options
    • Has invested significantly in specialized facilities and infrastructure

    Constitutional implications:

    • Section 9(3) prohibits unfair discrimination on the basis of disability
    • Section 27 protects rights to healthcare services
    • State has positive obligations to protect and promote disability rights

    The tension:

    • Restitution is a constitutional imperative
    • Disability services are a constitutional priority
    • Displacement forces a choice between two constitutional values

    8.0 Conclusion: A Case Without Winners

    The SARDA litigation illustrates the profound complexity of pursuing historical justice in a society still grappling with apartheid’s legacy. The case presents no villains and no heroes – only parties with legitimate interests caught in an impossible situation.

    8.1 The Sadien Family: Justice Long Delayed

    For the Sadien family, the Constitutional Court’s 2025 judgment represents a legal victory that still leaves them without possession of land 63 years after dispossession. The repeated delays – however well-intentioned SARDA’s concerns – have meant that many who were dispossessed have not lived to see justice. The multiplication of beneficiaries from 1 to 300 reflects both the passage of time and the generational impact of dispossession.

    The question remains: will the 2024 order prove executable, or will further litigation delay implementation even longer?

    8.2 SARDA: Displacement of a Vulnerable Service

    For SARDA and the children it serves, the judgment represents the loss of 40+ years of established operations. The organisation faces displacement from facilities it built and developed, serving a vulnerable population that may have limited alternative options. The promise of compensation – still undetermined – cannot restore what will be lost: established programmes, specialized facilities, and continuity of service.

    The suspension clause in the 2024 order offers some protection, but SARDA’s limited standing may constrain its ability to meaningfully participate in compensation determination.

    8.3 The State: An Impossible Balancing Act

    The state faces the unenviable task of satisfying constitutional obligations to both parties with limited resources and no perfect solutions. Every decision favouring one party necessarily disadvantages the other.

    8.4 Broader Reflections on Restorative Justice

    This case illustrates fundamental challenges in pursuing restorative justice:

    The impossibility of true restoration:

    • Time cannot be reversed
    • Families evolve and multiply
    • Land uses change
    • Third parties develop reliance interests
    • No remedy can fully restore what was lost

    The tension between individual and systemic justice:

    • Individual cases can raise valid procedural concerns
    • But systemic imperatives may require acceptance of imperfect processes
    • Finality serves both individual claimants and the broader restitution programme

    The ethical complexity:

    • Both SARDA and the Sadien family serve important social goods
    • Both have legitimate legal and moral claims
    • Any resolution requires one party to sacrifice

    8.5 The Role of Finality

    The Constitutional Court’s emphasis on finality reflects a hard truth: at some point, litigation must end even when questions remain unanswered. The doctrine serves several purposes:

    For claimants:

    • Prevents indefinite delay of constitutional rights
    • Provides certainty and closure
    • Enables life planning and economic development

    For the legal system:

    • Prevents endless re-litigation
    • Preserves judicial resources
    • Maintains public confidence in court orders

    For society:

    • Allows historical wounds to begin healing
    • Enables forward progress
    • Acknowledges that perfect justice may be impossible

    Whether the 2025 judgment strikes the right balance between these competing interests is a question on which reasonable people may disagree.

    8.6 Final Observations

    Several observations emerge from this lengthy litigation:

    1. Early notice matters: The 2013 failure to notify SARDA created the foundation for years of litigation. Better procedural safeguards at the outset might have enabled early resolution.
    2. Changed circumstances complicate finality: The multiplication of beneficiaries and other developments since 2017 created genuine questions about whether earlier orders remained appropriate.
    3. Compensation should be addressed early: Deferring compensation determination contributed to ongoing uncertainty and litigation.
    4. Planning for executability is essential: Orders should consider practical implementation challenges before being granted.
    5. No perfect solutions exist: When constitutional values conflict, any resolution necessarily involves difficult trade-offs.

    The SARDA case will likely be remembered both for its clarification of important legal principles and as a cautionary tale about the challenges of implementing restorative justice in complex circumstances where there are no easy answers and no truly satisfactory outcomes.

    Whether this judgment represents the conclusion of litigation or merely another chapter remains to be seen. What is certain is that both the Sadien family and SARDA continue to wait – the former for land they were promised, the latter for certainty about their future – whilst the children with disabilities served by SARDA’s programmes await resolution of forces far beyond their control.

     

  • A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Prescription and Embargo Provisions in Levy Claims

    A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Prescription and Embargo Provisions in Levy Claims

    It was with interest that I, having been the attorney for the purchaser in the Fernbrook case, read the recent article by Ernst Serfontein in DE REBUS examining prescription of HOA and body corporate levy claims, which helpfully surveys the developing case law in this area.

    The apparent tension between cases like Lukhele v Fernbrook Estate and Others (61719/13) [2015] ZAGPPHC 116 (“Fernbrook”) (allowing purchasers to raise prescription) and Osho Property Ventures (Pty) Limited v Body Corporate Construction Park and Others [2025] ZAGPPHC 281(“Osho”) / Bradley Scott Real Estate CC v Serengeti Exclusive Estate Home Owners Association NPC and Others [2017] ZAGPJHC 11 (“Bradley Scott”) (limiting this defence to registered owners) has understandably created uncertainty for practitioners

    I propose that these cases can be reconciled by examining the fundamental nature of prescription in South African law and how it interacts with real rights created by embargo provisions. Understanding this relationship provides a coherent framework for resolving seemingly contradictory outcomes.

    The Nature of Prescription: Defence vs Extinction

    In South African law, prescription does not extinguish a debt in the sense of causing it to cease to exist. Section 10(3) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 provides that payment by the debtor of a prescribed debt is regarded as payment of a debt.

    This provision, together with the requirement that prescription must be specifically pleaded as a defence rather than operating automatically, demonstrates that prescription confers a defence on the debtor in the form of a substantive right to refuse performance, whilst the prescribed obligation remains intact and can still be complied with.

    The practical consequence is significant: a prescribed debt becomes what may be described as a natural obligation that continues to exist but cannot be enforced through the courts if the debtor raises the defence of prescription. Crucially, if a debtor voluntarily pays a prescribed debt, the creditor is not unjustly enriched because the underlying obligation remains valid.

    This explains an important feature noted in several cases: prescription must be specifically pleaded. It operates as a defence available to the debtor, not as an automatic extinction of the debt by operation of law.

    ‘Amounts Due’ and the Embargo Provision

    The embargo provisions in title deeds (for HOAs) and s 15B(3) of the Sectional Titles Act (for body corporates) typically prevent transfer of property until ‘all amounts due’ to the HOA or body corporate have been paid. The critical question becomes: are prescribed levies ‘amounts due’?

    Given that prescription does not extinguish the debt but merely provides a defence against judicial enforcement, the answer must be yes. Prescribed levies remain ‘amounts due’. They are still owed, still constitute valid obligations, and can still be voluntarily satisfied. What has changed is solely that the debtor may prevent judicial enforcement by raising the defence of prescription.

    This understanding allows us to recognise that the embargo provision and the prescription defence operate in different spheres:

    • The personal right to claim arrear levies is subject to prescription as a defence in judicial proceedings.
    • The real right created by the embargo continues to operate because it does not depend on judicial enforcement. It simply conditions the exercise of another right (transfer) on the satisfaction of all amounts due.

    The Owner/Purchaser Distinction: A Matter of Legal Standing

    The distinction drawn in Osho and Bradley Scott between registered owners and prospective purchasers is not arbitrary, but reflects fundamental principles about who may invoke the defence of prescription.

    The Registered Owner’s Position

    The registered owner is the debtor against whom the claim for levies originally arose. When the HOA or body corporate seeks to enforce this claim judicially, the owner has standing to raise prescription as a defence.

    The defence is based purely on the passage of time: if more than three years have elapsed since the debt became due, the owner may plead prescription without needing to admit or deny the underlying obligation. The proper formulation focuses on the time bar rather than on acknowledging liability. For example, the owner may plead that ‘more than three years have elapsed since the date the plaintiff alleges the debt became due, and the claim is accordingly prescribed.’

    Care must be taken in how this defence is framed. Under section 14(1) of the Prescription Act, an acknowledgment of liability interrupts prescription and causes it to run afresh. Therefore, whilst raising prescription, the owner must avoid statements that could constitute an acknowledgment of owing the specific debt.

    This is the classic application of prescription as a defensive shield against judicial enforcement of a stale claim.

    The Prospective Purchaser’s Position

    The prospective purchaser occupies an entirely different legal position. The purchaser is not defending against judicial enforcement of a claim. Rather, the purchaser is seeking something affirmative from the HOA or body corporate: the issuance of a clearance certificate (or the lifting of the embargo) to enable transfer of the property.

    The embargo operates as a real right; a condition attached to the property itself that prevents transfer until all amounts due are paid. As noted in Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka NO and Others (768/2013) [2014] ZASCA 220 and confirmed in subsequent cases, this real right is enforceable against successive owners and does not prescribe after three years (but rather, as suggested in Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd N.O. v Portion of Erf 366 Wapadrand CC and Others [2016] ZAGPPHC 1046 potentially follows the 30-year prescription period applicable to servitudes).

    When a purchaser seeks to satisfy the embargo, they are not being sued on a prescribed debt. They are encountering a real right that requires payment of all amounts due as a precondition for transfer. Since prescribed debts remain ‘amounts due’ (even though unenforceable against the original debtor), they fall within the scope of this requirement.

    The purchaser lacks standing to raise prescription because:

    • They are not the debtor. Prescription is a personal defence available to the party against whom the claim arose.
    • They are not defending against enforcement. They are voluntarily seeking to satisfy a condition for transfer.
    • The embargo is not judicial enforcement. It operates as a real right independent of court proceedings.

    Consider an analogy: if a property is subject to a servitude requiring payment of a sum before development can occur, a purchaser cannot avoid that payment by arguing that the original owner’s obligation has prescribed. The servitude runs with the land.

    Reconciling the Case Law

    Viewed through this framework, the apparently contradictory cases can be reconciled.

    Fernbrook

    The court in Fernbrook held that a purchaser could raise prescription, but this may be understood as applying to a scenario where the HOA was attempting to enforce the debt against the purchaser as a new debtor. If the HOA claimed the purchaser had personally become liable for the full historic debt (rather than simply conditioning transfer on satisfaction of amounts due via the embargo), prescription would indeed be available.

    Alternatively, Fernbrook may have overlooked the distinction between the personal right and the real right, or the specific facts may have involved circumstances where the embargo itself was defective or inapplicable.

    Osho and Bradley Scott

    These cases correctly identify that where the embargo provision is properly invoked as a real right conditioning transfer, and the purchaser is not being sued as a debtor but is seeking clearance for transfer, the defence of prescription is not available to the purchaser. The purchaser must satisfy all amounts due, including prescribed amounts, because those amounts remain ‘due’ even though they are not judicially enforceable against the original owner.

    Changing Tides

    This case’s statement that the embargo is ‘a continuing wrong’ that prevents prescription can now be understood more precisely: the embargo itself (as a real right) does not prescribe on a three-year basis, and it continues to secure all amounts due including those that would be prescribed if the HOA attempted judicial enforcement against the original debtor.

    Practical Implications

    This framework provides clarity for several scenarios.

    For Registered Owners

    Owners may raise prescription as a defence if the HOA or body corporate sues them for levies more than three years in arrears. However, if they wish to sell their property, they must still satisfy all amounts due (including prescribed amounts) to obtain clearance, because the embargo operates independently of the prescription defence.

    An owner who successfully raises prescription in litigation but later wishes to sell faces an apparent paradox: the court has declared the HOA or body corporate cannot enforce the debt judicially, yet the owner must pay to obtain transfer. This is not truly paradoxical. The court judgment merely confirms that judicial enforcement is barred. It does not declare that the debt ceases to be ‘due’. The embargo, as a separate real right, continues to require satisfaction of all amounts due.

    For Prospective Purchasers

    Purchasers should understand that they cannot invoke prescription to reduce the amount required to satisfy the embargo. They are not being sued on a prescribed debt; they are satisfying a condition for transfer that encompasses all amounts due.

    However, purchasers have recourse through other means:

    • Negotiating the purchase price to reflect outstanding levies
    • Seeking an indemnity from the seller
    • In execution sales, potentially arguing that the sale conditions or court order limits their liability

    The prudent purchaser will conduct proper due diligence regarding outstanding levies and factor these into commercial negotiations, rather than relying on prescription arguments that are unavailable to non-debtors.

    For HOAs and Bodies Corporate

    These entities should:

    • Pursue judicial enforcement of levies timeously to avoid prescription as a defence
    • Recognise that the embargo provides protection beyond the normal prescription period
    • Understand that whilst they cannot judicially enforce prescribed debts against owners who raise the defence, they can condition transfer on payment of all amounts due

    The embargo thus serves as a powerful collection mechanism that operates independently of the limitations that prescription places on judicial remedies. However, it does not eliminate the importance of timeously pursuing claims, as owners who successfully raise prescription may have no immediate need to transfer their properties, leaving the HOA or body corporate without recourse for extended periods.

    Policy Considerations

    This framework balances competing legitimate interests.

    Protection for debtors is preserved through the prescription defence. Owners are not subject to judicial enforcement of stale claims where creditors have slept on their rights for extended periods.

    Protection for creditors is maintained through the embargo. HOAs and body corporates, which depend on levy income to maintain common property and provide services, are not left without remedy simply because prescription has run. The real right attaching to the property ensures that amounts due must eventually be satisfied upon transfer.

    Certainty for purchasers is achieved by making clear that due diligence regarding levies is essential. Purchasers cannot acquire property free of properly constituted real rights, and the embargo falls into this category. The law does not permit purchasers to benefit from prescription defences that are personal to the original debtor.

    Market efficiency is promoted because the embargo ensures that properties cannot be transferred whilst significant debts remain unpaid to entities responsible for maintaining the property and common areas. This protects subsequent purchasers and the broader community of owners.

    Addressing Potential Objections

    Does this create perpetual liability for prescribed debts?

    Not perpetual, but contingent. The prescribed debt remains unenforceable judicially against the owner. It only becomes relevant when the owner chooses to exercise their right to transfer the property. At that point, the embargo (which does not prescribe after three years) requires satisfaction. The owner can avoid this by simply retaining the property.

    Moreover, the embargo itself may be subject to the 30-year prescription period applicable to servitudes, as suggested in Changing Tides. This issue warrants further judicial clarification, but it indicates there is an outer temporal limit.

    Does this discourage property transactions?

    The effect on transactions is no different from any other encumbrance or condition in a title deed. Purchasers routinely deal with servitudes, restrictions, and other real rights. The existence of outstanding levies is discoverable through due diligence, and the amount payable is quantifiable. Purchasers can adjust their offers accordingly or require sellers to clear the amounts before transfer.

    Is this fair to purchasers at execution sales?

    Execution sales present particular considerations. The purchaser at such a sale is often required by the sale conditions to assume responsibility for certain debts. However, this is a matter of the specific sale conditions or court order authorising the sale, not a consequence of the general framework described here.

    If sale conditions purport to make a purchaser liable for prescribed debts in excess of what the embargo would require, this may be subject to challenge. But where the sale conditions simply recognise that the property is subject to an embargo that must be satisfied for transfer, this reflects the legal reality of the real right.

    Conclusion

    The apparent confusion in the case law dissolves once we recognise that:

    This framework respects both the policy behind prescription (protecting debtors from stale claims being enforced against them) and the legitimate interests of HOAs and body corporates in securing payment through real rights that run with the land.

    The solution is not to treat all levy claims as non-prescribable, nor to allow all purchasers to invoke prescription. Rather, it is to recognise that prescription and embargo provisions operate in different domains.

    The former operates as a defence to judicial enforcement, the latter as a real right conditioning property transfer. Prescribed debts retain their character as amounts due even when they cannot be judicially enforced against a debtor who pleads prescription.

    For practitioners, this framework offers clarity:

    • Advise owners that prescription is available as a defence to judicial claims but does not eliminate the debt for purposes of transfer.
    • Advise purchasers that due diligence regarding levies is essential and that prescription is not available to reduce clearance amounts.
    • Advise HOAs and body corporates that the embargo provides robust protection but does not eliminate the need for timeously pursuing judicial remedies where enforcement is required.

    The law, properly understood, provides a coherent and balanced approach to these competing interests.

  • CSOS does not Oust Jurisdiction of the High Court

    Case Summary: Parch Properties 72 (Pty) Ltd v Summervale Lifestyle Estate Owners’ Association and Others [2025] ZASCA 155

    Court: Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA)
    Case No: 171/2024
    Judgment Delivered: 17 October 2025
    Coram: Mokgohloa, Baartman and Coppin JJA, Steyn and Tolmay AJJA

    Background

    Parch Properties 72 (Pty) Ltd (“Parch”) developed 55 “garden cottages” on Erf 6343, Strand, adjacent to the Summervale Lifestyle Estate (“Summervale”).

    Summervale is governed by a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) established under a constitution approved by the City of Cape Town when it first authorised the gated retirement village’s subdivision and rezoning.

    The original developer (White Waves Trading (Pty) Ltd) was required under LUPO (Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985) to form an HOA with a constitution approved by the City.

    Parch sought a High Court declaration that its property (Erf 6343) fell within the “Area” defined in Summervale’s constitution, arguing that:

    • It should be recognised as part of the estate;
    • It was already treated as such in prior dealings; and
    • The HOA’s refusal to formally amend its constitution to include Erf 6343 was unreasonable.

    Procedural History

    • Parch applied to the Western Cape High Court for declaratory relief.
    • The High Court dismissed the application.
    • Parch appealed to the SCA, arguing that:
      1. The HOA’s refusal to amend its constitution was unreasonable.
      2. Its development already functioned as part of Summervale.
      3. The High Court erred by not treating the City’s 2010 rezoning condition as binding on the HOA.
    1. High Court Jurisdiction Not Ousted:
      The SCA reaffirmed that the CSOS Act does not exclude the High Court’s jurisdiction.
      • CSOS provides a statutory mechanism for dispute resolution but does not replace judicial authority.
      • Complex constitutional or administrative law issues remain justiciable in superior courts.
    2. Reasonableness Test:
      The SCA confirmed that reasonableness is an objective test based on facts and context.
      • The HOA was entitled to refuse inclusion because Parch’s development differed materially from the original retirement village concept (Summervale’s “character” requirement).
      • The garden cottages were rental units, not owner-occupied retirement dwellings, which diverged from Summervale’s design and purpose.
    3. City’s Rezoning Condition:
      The Court held that the rezoning condition imposed on Parch’s property by the City did not automatically bind the HOA.
      • The City’s condition required amendment of the HOA constitution, but such amendment still required the HOA’s own consent and compliance with its internal procedures.
      • The HOA was not compelled to amend its constitution if doing so was unreasonable or contrary to members’ collective interests.

    Court’s Conclusion

    • The HOA’s refusal to amend its constitution was reasonable, given:
      • The distinct nature and purpose of the two developments;
      • The need to preserve Summervale’s integrity as a retirement community; and
      • The absence of evidence showing unanimous or tacit consent by existing members.

    Order

    • Appeal dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel.
    • The HOA’s decision stands.
    • The City’s condition does not override the HOA’s internal governance rights.

    Key Principles Established

    • The CSOS Act (s39) does not remove the jurisdiction of the High Court.
    • HOA constitutions can only be amended according to their own rules and membership procedures.
    • A City rezoning condition requiring HOA inclusion cannot force membership if it contradicts the HOA’s approved constitution or purpose.
    • “Reasonableness” under administrative and community scheme law is objective, contextual, and fact-based.

    Trustee and HOA Guidance

    • HOAs must act reasonably and consistently with their constitutions when considering inclusion of new developments.
    • Developers cannot rely solely on municipal rezoning conditions to secure HOA membership rights.
    • Disputes over HOA membership or boundary amendments may be taken to CSOS—but complex constitutional disputes may still proceed in the High Court.

    Neutral Citation:


    📘 Parch Properties 72 (Pty) Ltd v Summervale Lifestyle Estate Owners’ Association and Others (171/2024) [2025] ZASCA 155 (17 October 2025)

    Disclaimer:
    This summary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
    For professional assistance, contact:
    🔗 Russell W. Warner – Attorney

  • Does mere membership of a close corporation expose a member to personal liability under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, when the corporation’s juristic personality is grossly abused?

    Does mere membership of a close corporation expose a member to personal liability under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, when the corporation’s juristic personality is grossly abused?

    Crous v Wynberg Boys High School and Others Case No: 200/2024 [2025] ZASCA 107 (18 July 2025)

    Parties

    • Appellant: Herman Mercer Crous
    • Respondents:
    • First: Wynberg Boys High School
    • Second: Eastco Travel CC
    • Third: Lorraine Fourie

    Facts

    • Crous and his daughter Fourie were members of Eastco Travel CC. Crous held 49%, Fourie 51%.
    • Fourie ran a fraudulent scheme via Eastco: selling airline tickets, cancelling them after purchase, and misappropriating refunds.
    • Wynberg Boys High School paid Eastco R638 880 for learner travel; the tickets were never honoured.
    • The High Court ordered the corporate veil pierced and held both Fourie and Crous personally liable.
    • Crous appealed, arguing he was unaware of the fraud, had not participated in the business since 2013, and had attempted (unsuccessfully) to resign in 2014.

    Issue

    Does mere membership of a close corporation expose a member to personal liability under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, when the corporation’s juristic personality is grossly abused?

    Law

    • Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984
    • Section 2(3): Default rule – members not liable merely due to membership.
    • Section 65: Court may disregard corporate personality where gross abuse is found—but must specify the person whose conduct caused or contributed to it.
    • Sections 63–64: Personal liability depends on active participation in wrongdoing.
    • Section 42: Fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation, not the public.
    • Case Law:
    • Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA)
    • Natal Joint Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)

    Decision

    • Appeal upheld.
    • The SCA ruled:
    • Membership alone does not trigger liability under s 65 — some degree of personal participation in abuse is required.
    • No evidence showed Crous was involved in or aware of the fraud.
    • The High Court wrongly imposed fiduciary duties to the public on Crous — members owe such duties only to the corporation itself.
    • High Court order set aside; Crous held not personally liable.

    Judges

    • Judgment by Makgoka JA and Tolmay AJA
    • Concurred by Weiner, Koen and Baartman JJA

    Attorneys

    For Appellant (Crous):

    • Counsel: E Mann with E Prophy
    • Instructed by: S Roux Inc., Pretoria; McIntyre Van Der Post, Bloemfontein

    For First Respondent (School):

    • Counsel: B J Manca SC with D Robertson
    • Instructed by: Dorrington Jessop Inc., Cape Town; Webbers Attorneys, Bloemfontein

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